Second of four parts

FILIPINOS rarely worry about sea lanes. Fuel obligingly arrives. Food magically fills supermarkets. Ships unload and vanish like campaign promises — until suddenly they do not.

Then something happening thousands of kilometers away becomes painfully local.

Trouble near the Persian Gulf raises diesel prices in Davao. A ship avoiding the Red Sea adds costs to goods bought by Filipino families. Geography mercifully keeps the fighting distant. Gasoline stations patriotically deliver the bill to us.

The oceans connect our livelihoods to events beyond our control. For an archipelago, maritime security is economic security. Our leaders usually discover this only after somebody raises the pump price.

America still matters, but cannot do everything

After 1945, US naval power, supported by allies, helped sustain the maritime order within which global commerce expanded. Japan imported energy. China became the world’s factory. Developing countries entered international supply chains.

The arrangement was never universal or trouble-free. Nevertheless, its beneficiaries became accustomed to somebody else carrying much of the security burden.

America remains the strongest naval power. The lesson of Hormuz is not that its navy has become useless. It is that military superiority cannot automatically make commercial passage safe, predictable, and affordable. A navy can destroy an installation. It cannot order Lloyd’s of London to feel reassured.

Then came Hormuz

Before the war, Hormuz carried roughly one-fifth of global crude oil and LNG supplies. And passage was open. Until Trump and Netanyahu’s intrusion exposed how a narrow passage could unsettle the world’s economy.

By late September, however, Middle Eastern oil exports were recovering, helped by alternative routes and restored pipeline operations. Some Qatar-linked LNG vessels were again visibly passing through Hormuz.

Recovery is welcome. Lasting security, unfortunately, missed the ceremony. Iran need not sink the US fleet to invoice everybody. Missiles, drones, mines and threats frighten shipowners, inflate premiums, and make shipping schedules decorative. The attacker just needs to threaten enough voyages. The defender must reassure everybody with cargo. Commerce gets creative. Consumers sponsor the adventure.

From Hormuz to our own waters

The same vulnerability extends through Bab el-Mandeb, Suez and Malacca to the South China Sea. These waterways connect energy producers, factories and markets. Trouble at one can strain the others.

But we must distinguish two problems: protecting international commercial navigation and defending Philippine maritime rights. Merchant ships can continue crossing the South China Sea while Filipino fishermen and supply vessels face obstruction.

An open shipping lane does not necessarily mean an open fishing ground for Filipinos. On Sept. 25, the Philippine Coast Guard reported that dangerous Chinese maneuvers had prevented completion of a resupply mission to Ayungin Shoal. No collision or injury was reported. The incident nevertheless illustrates coercion operating below the threshold of outright war.

Beijing need not close the entire sea to make our lawful activities difficult. It can leave international commerce moving while squeezing its smaller neighbor. Apparently, freedom of navigation can come with different subscription plans.

An ally not a substitute for good governance

Our American alliance remains essential. Intelligence, training, equipment and cooperation under EDCA strengthen our defenses. But an ally cannot replace a Philippine government that works.

Defense guidelines say armed attacks on either country’s troops, aircraft, or government ships, including coast guard vessels in the South China Sea, trigger mutual defense commitments. But China will harass the Philippines but stop short of an armed confrontation.

We cannot expect America to intervene whenever our fishermen run into trouble. Manila and Washington need coordinated plans for contingencies. The alliance should strengthen our defenses, preserve Filipino leadership, and protect our local communities. Agreements must define responsibilities and ensure readiness for emergencies. An alliance works best when both sides contribute something besides one side bringing the table.

China: Engage without surrendering

China is a neighbor, trading partner and major power. Geography will not remove it because we deliver an indignant speech. We should maintain diplomatic channels, negotiate practical arrangements that reduce danger, and pursue trade where it benefits Filipinos.

Communication can prevent an accident from becoming a crisis. But negotiation must rest on international law, including Unclos and the 2016 arbitral award. That award rejected China’s claimed historic rights to resources beyond the convention’s limits. It did not decide sovereignty over land territory.

We must defend our resource rights without pretending our exclusive economic zone excludes lawful navigation by others. Nor should commercial cooperation purchase Philippine silence. Friendship is welcome. A friendship requiring the smaller friend to stop fishing deserves another name.

What we should do

First, know who is doing what in our waters. Connect radar, satellite data, patrol aircraft, and reports from fishermen. Require agencies to share information immediately. End bureaucratic turf wars. We cannot defend waters we cannot monitor.

Second, keep our ships operating. Provide trained crews, fuel, maintenance, communications, and repair facilities. Keep the Philippine Coast Guard on patrol and strengthen the Navy to deter aggression. Defend fishermen, secure lawful resupply missions, and record acts of interference. Ships must serve the country long after officials finish cutting ribbons.

Third, prepare for disruption. Maintain emergency fuel reserves with clear release rules. Diversify suppliers and shipping routes. Improve storage, ports, and transport between islands. Ensure essential goods reach communities when major ports or routes close.

Buying from different suppliers helps little if all shipments pass through the same chokepoints. Find other routes, produce more energy at home, reducing waste. Prepare before shortages hit. Subsidies can lower costs, but they cannot replace missing supplies.

Fourth, protect Filipino seafarers. Assess voyage risks, require insurance and evacuation plans, and uphold their legal right to refuse dangerous work. Protect their lives before tragedy strikes, instead of offering condolences afterward.

Fifth, deepen cooperation with Japan, Australia, South Korea, India and Asean neighbors. Share intelligence, coordinate patrols and prepare joint responses to emergencies. Deliver stronger patrols, faster assistance and safer waters. Ministerial photographs will not defend us.

Finally, Congress must connect strategy to budgets and public accountability. Publish targets, track operational readiness, and scrutinize procurement. A national maritime policy cannot survive on presidential adjectives.

These responsibilities must also reach provincial governments, port operators and businesses, whose practical preparations determine whether national plans work outside Manila.

The test is whether fishermen can work, supplies can arrive and essential services can continue during disruption. That requires steady funding across administrations, exercises involving civilian agencies and honest reporting when plans fail. Preparedness is less photogenic than a summit, but considerably more useful when the tanker is late.

Who guards our interests?

No country can secure every sea lane. America remains central, but allies must share responsibility. The Philippines must strengthen its defenses and economy, uphold maritime rights, keep diplomacy open and build partnerships. Neither theatrical hostility toward China nor devotional dependence on America amounts to a Philippine strategy.

Washington protects American interests. Beijing protects Chinese interests. Manila might consider protecting Philippine interests. For an archipelago, that would be a promising maritime innovation.

Next week, we turn from a world without a reliable referee to a former president before an international court. The question remains: What happens when power encounters an institution it cannot command?

To be continued