TRUMP has always asserted that the Ukraine war was Biden’s having occurred during his watch. “If I were President in 2022, Putin would have not invaded Ukraine.” Trump boasted he would end this war on his first day as president. Then he curtailed weapons delivery to Ukraine allowing the war to aggravate, bringing Ukraine almost to its knees, giving the advantage to his BFF Putin.

In a stunning reversal that has sent shockwaves through global capitals, Donald, the TACO (Trump’s always chickens out) has executed a dramatic U-turn on his administration’s policy towards the war. (The Straits Times, by Jonathan Eyal, July 16, 2025.) This departure from a previously skeptical and often isolationist stance involves a new, multi-pronged strategy: the provision of sophisticated American weaponry to Kyiv, a firm demand for reciprocal military aid from European allies, and a 50-day ultimatum to Moscow to negotiate peace. This braggadocio was intended for his adoring and unthinking MAGA constituents. A toothless threat to Putin.

Failure to comply, Trump warns, will result in crippling sanctions, including a 100-percent tariff on China and India if they continue to purchase Russian oil. This policy pivot, following months of inaction and criticism of US aid, raises critical questions behind these impulses and their potential for success.

Volatile policy shifts

The motivations behind this abrupt shift are far from simple, representing a complex tapestry of domestic political calculus, personal ego, and shrewd economic opportunism, but a more pragmatic analysis points to a confluence of pressures.

Domestically, the electoral calculus is clear: “Trump’s support for Putin has no domestic electoral advantage.” (ibid, Eyal, The Straits Times.) With pressure mounting from within his own party and a public weary of a seemingly endless conflict, a more decisive posture became politically expedient.

Furthermore, there is a distinctly personal element at play. Trump’s reported frustration with Putin’s defiance, despite their previous conversations, suggests a bruised ego. The feeling of being played and insulted by the Russian leader appears to have triggered a reaction that is as much about personal pride as it is about international strategy.

Making money on the side

Beyond domestic politics and personal pique, a significant driver of this new policy is a powerful economic incentive, cleverly packaged as a strategic masterstroke. “The circuitous strategy of selling advanced American weapons systems to European allies, who in turn are expected to send their own Soviet-era or other armaments to Ukraine, is a core component of the plan. This allows Trump to assert that he is not wasting taxpayer’s money on direct aid—a frequent talking point for his base — while simultaneously generating a tidy profit for the American defense industry.” (ibid, Eyal, The Straits Times.) This financially driven approach provides a compelling, if cynical, rationale for the policy’s architecture, blending national security interests with a clear-eyed view of commercial benefit.

This new, aggressive stance is particularly striking when viewed against the backdrop of Trump’s past rhetoric and actions concerning Russia — from once describing Russia’s 2022 invasion as “genius” to being accused of a fundamental misunderstanding of Russian history and intentions. Trump has always been historically illiterate.

A pretend ceasefire

His previous calls for a ceasefire were widely seen as optics, lacking the credible threats or incentives necessary to compel a change in Moscow’s behavior, arguably making the bloodshed in Ukraine worse. This history of perceived conciliation and naiveté makes the current ultimatum to Putin all the more perplexing.

The immediate international reception has been a mixture of relief, apprehension, and deep-seated skepticism. For Zelenskyy, the promise of advanced air defense systems like the Patriot offers a desperately needed shield against relentless Russian aerial assaults. Yet, the 50-day ultimatum introduces a period of intense uncertainty, a high-stakes countdown that could either force a diplomatic breakthrough or provide Russia with a window to intensify its offensive.

Predictably, Moscow has met the announcement with defiance, gambling that Trump’s threats are mere bluster, and that his administration lacks the long-term commitment required for a protracted crisis. Putin has always been cynical of Trump’s bully tactics — being one himself. He has read Trump as TACO and can wait out this latest policy shift.

European allies, while delighted by the renewed American commitment, remain cautiously optimistic, fully aware of Trump’s famously fickle minded approach to foreign policy. The challenge for Europe is now twofold: first, to meet the logistical and political demands of transferring their own weapons to Ukraine, and second, to navigate the risks of escalation that come with it (ibid).

Germany might be pushed to send long-range missiles capable of striking deep within Russian territory, a move that could dramatically heighten tensions. Meanwhile, the 50-day delay before tariffs are imposed on China and India creates its own strategic ambiguity. It could be a genuine attempt to allow these nations to pressure Putin, an opportunity for them to divest from Russian energy, or simply a way for Trump to delay a potentially disruptive trade war.

Ultimately, this dramatic policy U-turn crystallizes into a single, critical question: Is this a credible, game-changing strategy, or is Trump still susceptible to Putin’s manipulation? This implies a newfound resolve born of frustration. Trump may not admit it, but he is being played by Putin and that his previous approach was misconceived from the start. Trump has always been putty in Putin’s hands, a nod to the ex-KGB’s formidable gambling instincts and his proven ability to exploit his adversary’s personality.

Be that as it may, Trump’s audacious policy reversal marks a pivotal yet unpredictable moment. It is a complex gambit born from a mix of political necessity, personal pride and economic self-interest. While it offers a glimmer of hope for Ukraine and a renewed sense of purpose for NATO, its success is far from guaranteed. The coming weeks will reveal whether this is a truly transformative moment that alters the trajectory of the war, or merely another chapter in a volatile geopolitical saga.

We get a hint at the post-Summit Putin-Trump meeting in Alaska this week. Briefly, Putin was “...positive describing the negotiations as constructive framing the meeting as a long overdue necessity, given that relations had plummeted to their lowest point since the Cold War.” He stroked Trump’s ego by confirming that had he been president in 2022, the war would not have occurred. Putin expressed a desire for a lasting settlement that would address the conflict’s primary causes and Russia’s legitimate concerns, not Ukraine’s “...asserting that this personal rapport is the key to bringing the conflict in Ukraine to an end... restoring a more pragmatic relationship between Russia and the United States.”

Trump in his cognitively impaired ramblings countered with classic Trumpian clarity: “There’s no deal until there’s a deal... but we have an extremely productive meeting, and many points were agreed to. There are just a very few left. Some are not that significant. One is probably the most significant, but we have a very good chance of getting there. We didn’t get there, but we have a very good chance of getting there.”

Many thought this was an insanely idiotic retort. The contrast between the two leaders is profound.

The Senate President crowed yesterday that the party he nominally coheads, PDP-Laban, has a “pleasant problem” — too many potential senatorial candidates. Koko Pimentel’s estimate is they have up to 20 possible choices for the 12-person slate for the 2019 senatorial race. But his list includes the five administration-affiliated senatorial incumbents up for reelection next year. This is a group that has made noises that, much as it prefers to remain in the administration camp, it is unhappy with the way PDP-Laban has been designating its local leaders and candidates, and therefore prefers to strike out on its own, perhaps in alliance with the other administration (regional) party, Hugpong ng Pagbabago, headed by the President’s daughter and current Davao City mayor, Sara Duterte.

Setting aside, then, the five-person “Force,” the administration-oriented but not PDP-friendly reelectionists (Nancy Binay, Sonny Angara, Cynthia Villar, Grace Poe, and JV Ejercito), what Koko’s crowing over is a mixed bag. Some of them have been floated by Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez (with whom Mayor Duterte clashed in recent months): six representatives (Gloria Macapagal Arroyo who is in her last term in the House of Representatives; Albee Benitez, Karlo Nograles, Rey Umali, Geraldine Roman, and Zajid Mangudadatu), three Cabinet members (Bong Go, Harry Roque, and Francis Tolentino), and two other officials (Mocha Uson and Ronald dela Rosa), which still only adds up to 11 possible candidates (who are the missing three?).

Of all of these, the “Force” reelectionists are only fair-weather allies of the present dispensation; their setting themselves apart is about much more than the mess PDP-Laban made in, say, San Juan where support for the Zamoras makes it extremely unattractive for JV Ejercito to consider being in the same slate. Their cohesion is about thinking ahead: Creating the nucleus for the main coalition to beat in the 2022 presidential election. The contingent of congressmen and congresswomen who could become candidates for the Senate, however, seems more a means to kick the Speaker’s rivals upstairs (at least in the case of Benitez and Arroyo) and pad the candidates’ list with token but sacrificial candidates, a similar situation to the executive officials being mentioned as possible candidates (of the executive officials, only Go seems viable, but making him run would deprive the President of the man who actually runs the executive department, and would be a clear signal that the administration is shifting to a post-term protection attitude instead of the more ambitious system-change mode it’s been on, so far).

Vice President Leni Robredo has been more circumspect, saying she’s not sure the Liberal Party can even muster a full slate. The party chair, Kiko Pangilinan, denied that a list circulating online (incumbent Bam Aquino, former senators Mar Roxas, Jun Magsaysay, TG Guingona, current and former representatives Jose Christopher Belmonte, Kaka Bag-ao, Edcel Lagman, Raul Daza, Gary Alejano and Erin Tañada, former governor Eddie Panlilio and Cebu City Mayor Tomas Osmeña) had any basis in fact.

What both lists have in common is they could be surveys-on-the-cheap, trial balloons to get the public pulse. Until the 17th Congress reconvenes briefly from May 14 to June 1 for the tail end of its second regular session (only to adjourn sine die until the third regular session begins on July 23), it has nothing much to do. Except, that is, for the barangay elections in May, after a last-ditch effort by the House to postpone them yet again to October failed.

Names can be floated but the real signal will come in July, when the President mounts the rostrum and calls for the big push for a new constitution—or not. Connected to this would be whether the Supreme Court disposes of its own chief, which would spare the Senate—and thus, free up the legislative calendar—to consider Charter change instead of an impeachment trial. In the meantime, what congressmen do seem abuzz over is an unrefusable invitation to the Palace tomorrow — to mark Arroyo’s birthday. An event possibly pregnant with meaning.

The Centrist View: Back to Basics

In an era marked by deepening social divides, persistent inequality, and political uncertainty, the Philippines stands at a critical juncture in its national life. Competing ideologies vie for dominance, often pulling the nation toward extremes. Amid this turbulence, a centrist perspective — rooted in the principles of human dignity and human rights — offers a balanced and principled framework for rebuilding trust, safeguarding citizens, and renewing democratic life.

Human Dignity as the Foundation of Rights and Responsibilities

At the core of the centrist vision is the belief that every Filipino possesses inherent human dignity — not conferred by the state, but intrinsic to being human. This dignity forms the moral and legal foundation of all human rights: civil liberties, political participation, and access to essential services such as education, healthcare, and livelihood.

But dignity is more than an entitlement; it is also a responsibility. It calls on individuals not only to claim their own rights but also to respect and uphold the rights of others — in speech, in conduct, and in civic life. The Centrist View affirms that rights and responsibilities are inseparable, and that a just society depends on mutual recognition of each person’s worth.

Human Rights in a Divided Political Landscape

In recent years, human rights in the Philippines have become a flashpoint — celebrated by some as the bedrock of democracy, dismissed by others as a hindrance to order and discipline. The centrist approach resists this false binary.

Instead, it upholds human rights as non-negotiable, especially for the most vulnerable: victims of extrajudicial killings, displaced indigenous communities, and ordinary citizens left behind by corruption and impunity. At the same time, it recognizes the need to contextualize rights within the broader social fabric — considering public safety, poverty, and institutional capacity.

The absolute moral positions of the Church — opposition to abortion, divorce, and same-sex marriage — moral truths which many Filipinos adopt unquestioningly, conflict with human rights discourses or secular principles such as reproductive health, women’s rights, and LGBTQ inclusion. The war on drugs under the Duterte administration was often justified using absolute moral language — portraying drug use as an evil that must be eradicated at all cost. This moral framing enabled EJK and human rights abuses, with limited public resistance due to the perceived moral righteousness of the campaign.

The anti-corruption rhetoric (all corruption is evil) uses moral absolutism (that certain actions are inherently right or wrong regardless of context, consequences, or cultural norms) but the application of justice in the Philippines is frequently selective, exposing the hypocrisy and dangers of absolutism when wielded by those in power. Human rights violations during Martial Law (torture, illegal detentions, censorship) can be judged as morally wrong in absolute terms, regardless of the justifications of national security or economic progress. However, moral relativism is often used to justify or downplay these events, especially by those who benefit from historical revisionism or political dynasties.

The late dictator son’s administration has emphasized technocratic leadership — appointing economic managers, military officials, and political elites into key positions — often sidelining consultative, grassroots-driven policy-making. His seeming focus on stability and economic continuity is reflected in his cabinet choices; still this pragmatic approach is viewed as centralizing authority and downplays participative governance, especially from civil society organizations, marginalized sectors, and opposition voices.

The DepEd and CHED directives to revise or soften the language around martial law abuses reflect a systemic push toward historical revisionism, legitimizing the current administration while erasing past atrocities. In lieu of outright censorship, the present administration uses strategic communication and digital manipulation through troll farms, algorithmic manipulation, and disinformation campaigns, to promote a favorable image. Contrary opinions and criticisms are viewed as “fake news” and attempts to discredit the administration are seen as libelous that merit congressional inquiry, purportedly, in aid of legislation.

The administration exhibits a form of authoritarian pragmatism more subtle than the previous dictatorship but no less concerning in its long-term implications. The challenge for Filipinos today is to critically assess this pragmatism: who benefits, who is silenced, and at what cost is “progress” achieved.

The Centrist View rejects both moral absolutism and authoritarian pragmatism. It seeks to foster a culture in which human rights are not only enshrined in law but also respected in practice, and where governance is accountable, transparent, and humane.

Rebuilding Trust in Institutions and the Rule of Law

The erosion of public trust in the justice system and the prevalence of political patronage have undermined faith in democratic institutions. When laws are applied unequally — when the wealthy and powerful escape accountability while the poor face violence and neglect — human dignity suffers.

A centrist response calls for the revitalization of institutions as a moral imperative:

• A justice system that is impartial, efficient, and accessible to all;
• Security forces that serve the Constitution and the people, not personal or political interests;
• Governance that is participatory, transparent, and responsive — especially to marginalized communities.

Restoring confidence in institutions, in the Centrist View, is not only about efficiency; it is about affirming the dignity of every citizen and the credibility of democracy itself.

Social Justice Without Extremism

Despite economic growth, the Philippines continues to grapple with stark inequality, underdevelopment in rural areas, and persistent conflict in regions such as Mindanao. Politics is downplaying the gains of the Bangsamoro Autonomous region, as changes in policies are manifest in each subsequent administration. These are not just policy failures — they are affronts to human dignity.

The centrist approach to social justice promotes meaningful, targeted reforms:

• Long-term investments in quality education and healthcare as fundamental human rights;
• Genuine land reform and rural development to empower farmers and indigenous peoples;
• Inclusive and decentralized governance, particularly in historically marginalized regions.

Unlike radical ideologies that call for revolution or sweeping overhauls, the Centrist View advocates for gradual, evidence-based reforms that preserve national stability while addressing deep-rooted injustices.

Pluralism and Mutual Respect in a Diverse Nation

The Philippines is a nation of many cultures, faiths, and identities. Respecting human dignity means embracing this diversity, not suppressing it.

The centrist vision affirms that unity can only emerge from mutual respect — not forced conformity.

All Filipinos — regardless of ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or social status — have the right to live free from discrimination and violence. Dialogue, rather than dogma, is the foundation of lasting peace and nation-building.

In this spirit, the Centrist View aligns with the universal values of human rights: that every person has the right to live, believe, speak, and participate fully in society — while also contributing to the common good.

Conclusion: A Call for Principled Moderation

The Centrist View in contemporary Philippine society is not a position of passivity or indifference. It is a call for principled moderation — an approach that seeks:

• To place human dignity at the center of policy and public life;
• To uphold human rights not as partisan slogans but as shared moral imperatives;
• To advance nation-building through inclusion, institutional reform, and civic responsibility.

In an age defined by polarization and populism, the Philippines needs a renewed commitment to moral clarity, balanced leadership, and shared humanity. In this vision, human dignity is not merely an abstract ideal — it is a living promise that belongs to every Filipino.