MY column last week was a personal account as a PCFR member-delegate to China. It hewed very close to the non-confrontational and excellent insights of Philippine Council of Foreign Relations (PCFR) president Babes Flores. My focus was on the Beijing roundtable (RTD), not on the Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou commercial leg of the trip. This column needs no imprimatur from the PCFR and its president; neither is it an addendum to the said report and, therefore, not in any way claiming to be an official account.

During the RTD, I adhered to the Chatham House rule (CHR) that guides the dissemination of information extracted during these high-level meetings and dialogues. This set of rules was originated to allow participants of a discourse like our Beijing RTD to be free to use discreetly whatever information is exchanged with the proviso that the identity or the affiliation of the speaker may not be indiscriminately revealed. The CHR does not apply to unofficial, informal or private conversations outside of the RTD unless such are deemed "off the record" and on background and must be invoked in advance. In any case, none of the occurrences, therefore, are attributable.

But I wear two hats. One as a member-delegate and the other as a newspaper columnist exercising my journalistic license to put things in proper perspective to help clarify events, particularly during deliberations, where unfortunately, there were none. Such prerogatives are used not as an exception to the Chatham House rule but, in fact, to enhance the same. The raison d'etre is simply that the conduct of the RTD restrained many of the 11 from fulfilling the very purpose of an RTD — a free exchange of ideas projected through the prism of individual logic while being filtered and modulated through a lively or even heated debate within an acceptable and conventional set of decorum.

Clash of systemic perceptions

Coming from our type of society, where cavalier and sometimes reckless media practitioners give a bad name to "free press and free speech," muzzling the PCFR participants as a courtesy to the feelings of the hosts was rather disappointing — though perfunctorily self-imposed by some members. The delegation understands only too well that the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) must adhere to the Chinese Communist Party line. But this should not be a hindrance to allowing the guests a certain leeway to argue a contrasting side, perhaps to arrive at a workable agenda that would justify the annual RTDs.

But to be fair to CPIFA, it was perhaps the misplaced self-restraint of the PCFR that prevented the rest from introducing arguments that could advance intellectual conversation and interchange; though at this level of engagement, the language of diplomatese has not been carefully observed and oftentimes transgressed, reflecting perhaps an amateurish appreciation of the arcana of diplomacy — by both sides.

Clearly, our Chinese counterparts honored us by gathering their best and brightest for this RTD. But their system impels them to sing Xi Jinping's song, as it were, even prepared to articulate belligerently the same as they did; a dissonance in contrast to the PCFR's freewheeling presentations that may simply reflect an individualistic but democratic interpretation of our mission objectives. But then again, their panel had a clarity of purpose. Ours did not.

On the other hand, there was not an iota of information during the RTD that contained sensitive information not already in the public domain. There was sharp verbal repartee and veiled affronts, but these were strictly par for the course for two clashing ideological perspectives, resulting in a non-exchange of ideas but a barter of monologues not subject to debates and thus outside the purview of the CHR. But such are the dynamics of the rarified air of international parleys.

The aftermath

In the foreign relations firmament, there is none as sensitive and important an issue as the current Philippine-China relationship, equivalent in importance to that between the Philippines and the US. When President Obama initiated his Pivot to Asia, shifting focus away from the US debacles in the Middle East, China emerged front and center. And with it was the prominence of its nine-dash line. To recall, the dispute over ownership of the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea to us) remained relatively dormant until the 1970s when China began asserting its territorial claim — after the discovery of potentially large energy reserves in the area. These events have sensitive relevance, as we shall soon see.

Fresh from the China trip, the PCFR barely rested when a looming concern with China reared its ugly head. Our government passed on Nov. 8, 2024, two laws: the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act. President Marcos in Malacañang announced, "With these pieces of legislation, we align our domestic laws with international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or Unclos, improve our capacity for governance and reinforce our maritime policies for economic development and for national security."

Promptly, Beijing summoned the Philippine ambassador to express its objection to the two new Philippine laws, asserting China's maritime rights and sovereignty over disputed areas of the South China Sea, "illegally including Huangyan island and Nansha islands" — our Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly islands, respectively. China's agitation and formal complaint are within their prerogative, whereas our strong objection to this rebuke is within ours.

But it is a truism in diplomacy during times of crisis, like what we are undergoing now in the SCS/WPS, to refrain from escalating conflicts through extraneous pronouncements and, yes, laws that could have unintended consequences, reinforcing what already is a given reality and, in fact, already within the purview of international agreements like the Unclos. Added to this is the historic 2016 arbitral award that has granted the Philippine position international legitimacy — although unrecognized by Beijing. Thus, the new laws, RA 120641 and RA 12065, in my opinion, are basically a redundancy and an "in your face" externality that does not advance diplomacy.

On the other hand, the PCFR, even prior to the promulgation of these laws, was also confronted with similar statements, pregnant with nuances and even veiled threats by a high-ranking Chinese diplomat: "Please don't push China to a corner... you know that we can easily take over Thomas Shoal (Ayungin, BRP Sierra Madre) anytime. But we are constraining ourselves since we are a responsible great power... let us leave the (maritime debate) to the legal experts and instead focus on mutual cooperation." Or words to that effect.

A paradigm shift — an imperative

Thus, I arrive at the whole point for the second half of this column. And I draw heavily from the Alejandro Flores speech of April 24, 2021, where he threw a rhetorical question to the membership and the board as to the relevance of PCFR as an "eminent foreign relations NGO by 2025." "Are we on track"? he asked.

Being a tyro on the culture of the PCFR, I assume the correct response is "yes!" — having seen firsthand the skill, competence and precious tutelage by each member of the delegation. But the PCFR could further enhance its role if it is allowed to give direct inputs to the country's lawmaking body — Congress, consisting of the House and the Senate.

This, I humbly submit.

FOR the continued dismantling of the Duterte political structures, discussed in last week's column, it must begin and end in Davao. This dynasty was midwifed incongruously by President Cory Aquino upon the appointment of its patriarch, Rodrigo Duterte, as OIC vice mayor in 1986. Over the next three decades, his genius, charisma, brutal iron will and organizational skills ran roughshod over his political rivals and erstwhile allies awaiting the maturation of his children now installed in powerful elected positions, most prominent of which is Vice President Sara, the presidential heiress-apparent.

The year 1986 saw the end of the Marcos martial law regime, an era marked by suppression of dissent, the rise of cronyism and bureaucrat capitalism that had a stranglehold on the economy, mounting impunity, and the abrogation of the rule of law. The repression of democracy allowed the extreme left to create in Davao a laboratory for the seeds of communist ideology to propagate along with its deadly practices. Oldtimers still remember "Nicaragdao," the poor barangay in Davao, which was a breeding ground for the NPA and the almost daily spectacle of policemen killed by the "sparrow units" and left in the streets to be seen by the community as a warning; and the "salvaging" of criminals and the innocents alike. The soaring crime rate was driven not so much by ideology but by the influx of illegal drugs. These were the conditions obtained when the Deegong appeared in the political scene, having won as mayor in 1988 — a study in perfect timing.

Post-EDSA 1986

Cory's administration tried dismantling the Marcos martial law structures but sadly, only the façade and language and its trappings were altered. Superimposing it with her concept of democracy — however elitist, substituting Marcos cronies with her "Kamag-anak Inc.," the remnants, the elements and the mindset of martial law prevailed.

This was well understood by the Deegong. With an iron fist, he adopted the communist and extreme left formula for discipline and control, but with a twist — cloaking it with motherhood statements of democracy and his version of the rule of law, including his own "death squad" — the DDS — later absurdly renamed the Duterte Diehard Supporters. And this recipe was applied to rid the city of drug lords and pushers and drug-related crimes.

In the four decades post-Cory, the Deegong hammered a coalition of the far left to the right of the political spectrum with the grudging consent of Davao's elite, propelling him to power. And he delivered! His solution, which has gained a modicum of success, locally labeled "Tok-tok Hangyo," or Tokhang for short, failed in its national stage version when he was President ("Dismantling the Duterte political structures," The Manila Times, Oct.10, 2024).

Reinvigorating an old warrior

Several congressional hearings "in aid of legislation," starting with the bumbling quad committee of the lower house upon the behest of Speaker Martin and Malacañang, were conducted not only to pin the EJK and human rights abuses on the Deegong but to degrade VP Sara's possible presidential run in 2028.

In the subsequent Senate blue ribbon committee hearings, the EJK proceedings fell short and backfired and instead exposed the incompetence of the inquisitors. The senators played right into the genius of the man, regaining his waning popularity and reinforcing his status as a "strong man with political will." This could spell a great advantage to the Deegong, fortifying his comeback to Davao as a mayoral candidate against another budding political dynasty — the Nograleses.

Boy Nograles' progeny

The Duterte political narrative is incomplete without the Nograleses. The family's own patriarch, "Boy Nogie," was himself a character writ large. A scion of Davao's old families. They were the landed elite who, at the founding of the city, were its leading lights, in contrast to the transplanted Duterte clan — the outsiders. Urbanization and the influx of the pre-war innovative Japanese and the hardworking and entrepreneurial Chinese, particularly from China's Fujian province and the carpetbaggers, changed drastically its demographic, cultural and social profile. The children of the elite were enrolled in local schools but were sent abroad or to the nation's capital to finish their education, coming back to the city to reclaim what to them was originally their entitlement.

Boy Nogie was a better version of these entitled and a rival for the city's leadership. But his local political organization never could compete successfully with the Deegong's mass base as his milieu was the national political scene, having reached his pinnacle as the powerful speaker of the House. His dream to head the city as mayor collided with that of the Deegong's. And he lost — three times. But the biggest transgression of that rivalry was the victor humiliating his rival publicly and intensely — proverbially kicking the man when he was down. Today, Boy Nogie's progeny, the siblings Karlo and Migs, have come of age and will contest the iron grip of the Dutertes.

Impending showdown

The Nograleses are not without their detractors. I will quote from an editorial ("Optic Politics," Oct. 8, 2024):

"Karlo Nograles' decision to run against the Dutertes in Davao City raises serious questions not only about his judgment but also about the deep-rooted values that underpin political survival and trust in the Philippines. In a political culture where personal loyalty and a sense of utang na loob (debt of gratitude) are sacrosanct, Nograles' candidacy represents a flagrant betrayal of these foundational values.

"Nograles, once a close ally of former President Rodrigo Duterte, benefited immensely from his connection to the Dutertes. As Cabinet Secretary under Duterte, he was vaulted from relative political obscurity to a position of influence and power. This was not just a strategic political appointment; it was a personal investment by the Dutertes in Nograles, a native Davaoeño, to align him with their longstanding political machinery."

This editorial was very harsh on Karlo's succumbing to the enticements of the BBM/Liza/Martin trio to run against the Dutertes. This shows unfamiliarity with the Duterte-Nograles saga. Davaoeños, particularly among the elites and old families of Davao, have long memories, and they will not forget the public humiliation inflicted by the Deegong on one of their own. No amount of inducement by the Deegong on Karlo — cabinet posts and sinecures — can alleviate the insults hurled upon the father.

Many of the political cognoscenti understood only too well the Deegong's moves as this earlier co-optation of Karlo inhibited the old families and the Davao elite from moving against Duterte's hold in Davao politics. But today, the Deegong's male heirs are no match in many metrics against Boy Nogie's issue — Karlo and Migs. The Davao old families and the elite, few as they are, have enough clout and influence to meet head-on the Duterte dynasty.

"Utang na loob," as proffered by the Optic editorial, is a convoluted Filipino value, the bane of good governance and the driving force behind Philippine patronage politics. Our political leaders have long been experts at perverting this Filipino trait as a corrupting tool to the Filipino masses.

Through this open challenge to the Duterte dynasty, Karlo and Migs — Boy Nogie's bloodline — will have to avenge their father's humiliation.