MY column last week was a personal account as a PCFR member-delegate to China. It hewed very close to the non-confrontational and excellent insights of Philippine Council of Foreign Relations (PCFR) president Babes Flores. My focus was on the Beijing roundtable (RTD), not on the Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou commercial leg of the trip. This column needs no imprimatur from the PCFR and its president; neither is it an addendum to the said report and, therefore, not in any way claiming to be an official account.

During the RTD, I adhered to the Chatham House rule (CHR) that guides the dissemination of information extracted during these high-level meetings and dialogues. This set of rules was originated to allow participants of a discourse like our Beijing RTD to be free to use discreetly whatever information is exchanged with the proviso that the identity or the affiliation of the speaker may not be indiscriminately revealed. The CHR does not apply to unofficial, informal or private conversations outside of the RTD unless such are deemed "off the record" and on background and must be invoked in advance. In any case, none of the occurrences, therefore, are attributable.

But I wear two hats. One as a member-delegate and the other as a newspaper columnist exercising my journalistic license to put things in proper perspective to help clarify events, particularly during deliberations, where unfortunately, there were none. Such prerogatives are used not as an exception to the Chatham House rule but, in fact, to enhance the same. The raison d'etre is simply that the conduct of the RTD restrained many of the 11 from fulfilling the very purpose of an RTD — a free exchange of ideas projected through the prism of individual logic while being filtered and modulated through a lively or even heated debate within an acceptable and conventional set of decorum.

Clash of systemic perceptions

Coming from our type of society, where cavalier and sometimes reckless media practitioners give a bad name to "free press and free speech," muzzling the PCFR participants as a courtesy to the feelings of the hosts was rather disappointing — though perfunctorily self-imposed by some members. The delegation understands only too well that the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) must adhere to the Chinese Communist Party line. But this should not be a hindrance to allowing the guests a certain leeway to argue a contrasting side, perhaps to arrive at a workable agenda that would justify the annual RTDs.

But to be fair to CPIFA, it was perhaps the misplaced self-restraint of the PCFR that prevented the rest from introducing arguments that could advance intellectual conversation and interchange; though at this level of engagement, the language of diplomatese has not been carefully observed and oftentimes transgressed, reflecting perhaps an amateurish appreciation of the arcana of diplomacy — by both sides.

Clearly, our Chinese counterparts honored us by gathering their best and brightest for this RTD. But their system impels them to sing Xi Jinping's song, as it were, even prepared to articulate belligerently the same as they did; a dissonance in contrast to the PCFR's freewheeling presentations that may simply reflect an individualistic but democratic interpretation of our mission objectives. But then again, their panel had a clarity of purpose. Ours did not.

On the other hand, there was not an iota of information during the RTD that contained sensitive information not already in the public domain. There was sharp verbal repartee and veiled affronts, but these were strictly par for the course for two clashing ideological perspectives, resulting in a non-exchange of ideas but a barter of monologues not subject to debates and thus outside the purview of the CHR. But such are the dynamics of the rarified air of international parleys.

The aftermath

In the foreign relations firmament, there is none as sensitive and important an issue as the current Philippine-China relationship, equivalent in importance to that between the Philippines and the US. When President Obama initiated his Pivot to Asia, shifting focus away from the US debacles in the Middle East, China emerged front and center. And with it was the prominence of its nine-dash line. To recall, the dispute over ownership of the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea to us) remained relatively dormant until the 1970s when China began asserting its territorial claim — after the discovery of potentially large energy reserves in the area. These events have sensitive relevance, as we shall soon see.

Fresh from the China trip, the PCFR barely rested when a looming concern with China reared its ugly head. Our government passed on Nov. 8, 2024, two laws: the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act. President Marcos in Malacañang announced, "With these pieces of legislation, we align our domestic laws with international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or Unclos, improve our capacity for governance and reinforce our maritime policies for economic development and for national security."

Promptly, Beijing summoned the Philippine ambassador to express its objection to the two new Philippine laws, asserting China's maritime rights and sovereignty over disputed areas of the South China Sea, "illegally including Huangyan island and Nansha islands" — our Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly islands, respectively. China's agitation and formal complaint are within their prerogative, whereas our strong objection to this rebuke is within ours.

But it is a truism in diplomacy during times of crisis, like what we are undergoing now in the SCS/WPS, to refrain from escalating conflicts through extraneous pronouncements and, yes, laws that could have unintended consequences, reinforcing what already is a given reality and, in fact, already within the purview of international agreements like the Unclos. Added to this is the historic 2016 arbitral award that has granted the Philippine position international legitimacy — although unrecognized by Beijing. Thus, the new laws, RA 120641 and RA 12065, in my opinion, are basically a redundancy and an "in your face" externality that does not advance diplomacy.

On the other hand, the PCFR, even prior to the promulgation of these laws, was also confronted with similar statements, pregnant with nuances and even veiled threats by a high-ranking Chinese diplomat: "Please don't push China to a corner... you know that we can easily take over Thomas Shoal (Ayungin, BRP Sierra Madre) anytime. But we are constraining ourselves since we are a responsible great power... let us leave the (maritime debate) to the legal experts and instead focus on mutual cooperation." Or words to that effect.

A paradigm shift — an imperative

Thus, I arrive at the whole point for the second half of this column. And I draw heavily from the Alejandro Flores speech of April 24, 2021, where he threw a rhetorical question to the membership and the board as to the relevance of PCFR as an "eminent foreign relations NGO by 2025." "Are we on track"? he asked.

Being a tyro on the culture of the PCFR, I assume the correct response is "yes!" — having seen firsthand the skill, competence and precious tutelage by each member of the delegation. But the PCFR could further enhance its role if it is allowed to give direct inputs to the country's lawmaking body — Congress, consisting of the House and the Senate.

This, I humbly submit.