Second of 3 parts

AFTER 18 months, it seems obvious that NATO and Zelenskyy are running out of options. There are limits to how much military aid can be sent to Ukraine to fight non-nuclear conventional warfare. And NATO does not possess the wherewithal nor the will to put boots on the ground. Even the former Eastern European allies of the old USSR, which are now NATO members, will not have the gumption to involve themselves by sending warm bodies. And if they do, they will still need war materiel handouts from NATO. It seems that Putin, who after the Yevgeny Prigozhin telenovela was deemed weak by the West turns out to be still firmly in control — not only of the Kremlin cabal but the war in Ukraine. This column attempts topresent another perspective viewed against the framework of Putin's original declared intentions in Ukraine.

Putin's justification for his Ukraine adventure was to preserve Russia's geopolitical strategic interests against the encroachment of NATO (Russia's Black Sea fleet is in Sevastopol, Crimea); protect the rights and interests of the ethnic Russian-speaking population in the Donbas and Crimea; and replace an anti-Russian Ukraine government, which is aligning closer with the West. The overarching cover of purported denazification of Ukraine was earlier debunked and did not gain wide traction in the global community. Putin had to recalibrate his strategy after the disastrous first few weeks in February, March and April of 2022.

At the outset, Russia never did indicate destroying a country that provides a buffer against the USSR's old nemesis. Russia preferred a neutral Ukraine that it can do business with, Ukraine having one of the biggest economies within Russia's sphere of influence. It is obvious that the pro-Western Zelenskyy had to be replaced by a Russia-friendly or puppet government. These probably are the reasons why Russia moves cautiously and deliberately, avoiding major confrontations. As it is, the never-ending war is bleeding NATO dry, draining its resources, and depleting its logistics. And reportedly, despite the Western sanctions, Russia's economy is growing by a comfortable annual 2 percent. This war of attrition is likely to drive a wedge between NATO allies.

NATO'S belligerence


The Ukraine war should not have happened. But the West, particularly the neocons in DC, propagated the fiction that Putin is an imperialist bent on reviving the old USSR. There never was any evidence of this. Putin came to power only in 2000 a decade after the Cold War ended. It took another two decades for the Ukraine crisis to erupt in 2014 induced by NATO intrusion. In those intervening years, there were no accusations in the West of Putin having imperial aspirations.

Post-Cold War, a weak Russia was intent on holding on to its sphere of influence. But in 2004, NATO expanded its membership to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all former Soviet republics. This expansion which NATO justified under the pretext of promoting stability and security in Europe yielded undesired consequences. It was NATO's opening gambit for East European hegemony. Russia saw this as a threat to its security. In retrospect, in a multipolar world, Russia could have even become a US/NATO ally against China rising in the East.

In 2008, another of the USSR's former Soviet republics began to seek closer ties with the West intending to join the alliance — encouraged no doubt by NATO. Russia invaded Georgia, justifying the intervention of putting down separatist groups in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, simmering ethnic and territorial disputes between Georgia and the breakaway regions. This is a template that Russia employed in 2014, when it annexed Crimea and occupied Ukraine's Donbas regions.

Putin's acts could not simply be attributed to his imperial impulses. NATO's relentlessdecadeslongbelligerence impelled Russia's response. NATO's military alliance during the Cold War was met to some extent by the Soviet Warsaw Pact. But after the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO lost its reason for being and should have been disbanded. But the alliance moving into Russia's borders became an existential threat.

An analogous case would be the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Russia's deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba posed an existential threat to America and the Western hemisphere. This brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war. The same logic can be applied to NATO's moves toward the borders of Russia.

Political realism With these geopolitical realities in a flux as backdrop, John Mearsheimer, an eminent political scientist, articulated in his theory of political realism a compelling assessment, postulating that "...great powers are principally concerned about the balance of power... they care about how powerful they are relative to other powers." Evidently, they will take advantage of any weakness as this is imperative for their own survival. Mearsheimer further advanced that at the incipient unipolar world with the ascendancy of America over the carcass of the USSR, its remnant Russia was so weak emboldening America to do whatever it wanted. This simply follows the tenets of political realism. That the first primordial consideration is to be more powerful, economically, and militarily to survive and flourish. The second consideration is "...political realism doesn't discriminate between democracies and non-democracies; or liberal states and fascist states or communist states." Therefore, the emerging hegemon — America, must maximize its relative power regardless of the political order at the home front, the GOP- or Democratic-led government. Traditional inclinations by the Western-influenced, Greco-Roman governance concept still adhere to democracies being the "good guys" and communism, authoritarianism, fascism, etc., the "bad guys." Political realism simply negates these concepts. Competing for power and being more powerful trumps all ideological concepts.

During the Unipolar era from the Cold War's end, 1990/1991 to 2017, the US, the lone world hegemon with no rival for political power on the horizon, acted not in a political realist but in a liberal fashion, pursuing foreign policy as liberal hegemony. Why? Because great power politics no longer mattered with no rivals in the system.

But with the transition to a multipolar world, it was a mistake for America to be conducting itself as if it were still the only kid on the block using the tools and concepts of unipolar conventions.

So, America pursued a liberal foreign policy of engagement helping China get rich, integrating it into international institutions like WTO (China already is in World Bank and IMF) hoping it would become a responsible stakeholder and voila! — a liberal democracy, like the Asian Tigers did a few decades back.

Xi Jinping was only too glad to accommodate America's naivete and proceeded to grow economically and built China's military. Its navy is now the biggest in the world. It took a Donald Trump to understand this geopolitical development and began to confront China but unable to follow through, even unwisely alienating America's allies in the process. Mearsheimer put it succinctly upon the ascendancy of Joe Biden: "...America is pursuing realpolitik behavior towards China, but disguises it with liberal rhetoric — with a mailed fist. America has to change its posture as China grew powerful." America began to fear China!